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Abstract 
 
In this paper we demonstrate that even if policies prior to reform have been rational, it is possible, in fact 
in certain policy areas likely, that a green tax reform, contrary to the perceived wisdom among 
economists, will be associated with a double-dividend, i.e. with both environmental and fiscal benefits. 
We first establish this theoretically by avoiding imposing potentially unrealistic separability assumptions, 
and by recognising that taxation involves administrative costs. To illustrate our theoretical results, we use 
graphical tools well-known from fishery economics to assess the effects of the introduction of a tax on 
road transport. 
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1. Introduction 
The "Double-dividend question” has attracted considerable attention among both 
policy-makers and economists, and in the context of the debate on global warming it 
has received increased interest. The question is whether replacing a tax on labour with 
taxes on commodities causing environmental damage will increase social welfare, not 
only by internalising the negative external effects (the first dividend), but also by 
reducing the distortionary costs of the tax system (the second dividend), thus creating a 
double-dividend. Based on the idea that the tax revenue obtained from environmental 
taxes can be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes, the initial contributions by 
environmental economists to the analysis of the issue suggested that a green tax reform 
would in general be associated with a double-dividend. However, as subsequent 
contributions by economists with a background in public economics have made clear, 
the intuition behind the initial suggestion was flawed by not taking into account the 
negative effects of an increase in environmental taxes on the efficiency of the tax 
system. Now, the opposite view - that a green tax reform is unlikely to generate a 
significant double-dividend - has become the received wisdom among economists (see 
e.g. Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994, Goulder 1995 and Bovenberg 1999)1. It is further 
argued that if previous policies have been economically rational, then a green tax 
reform cannot generate a double-dividend at all (Christiansen 1998). 
In the present paper we challenge these views based on the observations that neither 
externalities nor consumption is separable from leisure, and that differentiating tax 
rates is associated with additional administrative costs. Using the expenditure function 
approach, rather than the indirect utility function approach, which allow us to derive 
optimality conditions without making unrealistic separability assumptions, we gain 
new insight into what determines the optimal tax system and level of abatement in the 
case of a congested (or polluted) public good. Drawing on this insight we identify the 
conditions for a green tax reform to be associated with a double-dividend. We show 
that results by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) and Bovenberg (1999) can be 
expressed as special cases of our general cost-benefit rule. We also identify what 
determines the increase in social welfare due to a utility maximising change in the 
level of abatement in response to a tax reform, what Sandmo (2000) call a “third 
dividend”, and how the change in abatement changes the first and the second dividend 
of the initial tax reform. Finally, to support our intuition using graphical tools well-
known from fishery economics, we illustrate why imposing a tax on road transport at a 
higher level than on other goods is likely to result in a significant double dividend. 
For the sake of exposition we adopt a model with a representative consumer, fully 
realising that in any application of the theoretical results in practice, taking 
distributional considerations into account is of paramount importance for political 
relevance. Furthermore favourable redistributional consequences increase the scope 
                                                 
1Bovenberg (1999) concludes his survey paper by saying, "The overall message of this paper is 
disappointing for those who expect substantial non-environmental benefits from green tax reforms. The 
analysis shows that stringent conditions need to be met in order for an environmental tax reform to 
yield a double-dividend".  
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for a green tax reform being associated with a double-dividend, a point we, however, 
do not elaborate in the context of this article. 
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we set out the model. In Section 3, we 
explain why so far in the literature the challenge of deriving optimal tax formulae in 
the case of a congested or polluted public good has not been addressed in a satisfactory 
way. In Sections 4 and 5, the core part of the paper, we first derive and interpret 
conditions for optimal taxation in the presence of a congested public good, and then 
establish conditions under which a green tax reform is likely to be associated with a 
double-dividend. In Section 6 we provide intuition for the theoretical results taking the 
taxation of road transport as an example. A final section concludes. 
 
2. Model setting  
We consider a competitive economy with one representative household. In the 
economy there is one primary factor, which we label 0 and interpret as “labour”, “a 
dirty good” (good 1), which congests (or pollutes) the public good, and a “clean good” 
(good 2), which does not.  
Consumer prices are  and producer prices .  
We represent the behaviour of the representative household as the result of the 
maximisation of a strictly quasi-concave utility function  where 
2 is the household’s net demand vector and  the amount of the 
public good. The corresponding indirect utility function is  where is the 
household’s unearned income.  
The amount of the congested public good is determined by the consumption of the 
dirty good and the level of government abatement A, i.e. 
  (1) 
where  and , and hence  and . The household’s 
utility is thus affected in two ways, directly by the consumption of the dirty good, and 
indirectly by the detrimental effect of the consumption of the dirty good on the public 
good, i.e.  (cf. Sandmo 1975, 2000). 
Production possibilities are represented by constant returns to scale production 
functions with  being the output of good i and  the use of the primary factor in its 
production.  
The government's resource requirements is . Government 
expenditures are the cost of abatement  A and other government expenditures, 
                                                 
2 By the negativity convention, the supply of the primary factor to the market is measured negatively, 
i.e. . 
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including the administrative costs of taxation, is . The household’s endowment of 
the primary factor is partly consumed by the household itself and therefore not 
observable by the government; however, the government is able to collect taxes based 
on observation of the household’s net demand, but only at a certain cost, which is 
assumed to depend on the complexity of the tax system, but not on the level of 
taxation. The cost of a proportional tax system is for example assumed to be smaller 
than that of a tax system where the tax rates are differentiated. Contrary to in standard 
optimal tax models,  is therefore endogenously determined. 
For a tax system  to be feasible, the three basic conditions for a market 
equilibrium: Profit maximisation, Utility maximisation and Material balance have to 
be satisfied, as well as the condition for the government’s budget to be balanced.  
Profit maximisation implies that  
  i∈ (1,2) (2) 
  i∈ (1,2) (3) 
where  is the fixed technical coefficient in the production of good i.  
We represent the condition for utility maximisation as3 
    (4) 
    (5) 
using the expenditure function approach4. As the household receives no profit income 
or transfers from the government,  
Material balance requires  
           i∈ (1,2) (6) 
 
   (7) 
By successive substitutions, (1) to (7) may be reduced to 
  +  +  = 0 (8) 
 (9) 
 (10) 
  (11) 
 
                                                 
3 Using the subscript notation, we write 
 
to indicate the vector of derivatives of the 
expenditure function and  to indicate the matrix of compensated demand derivatives. 
4 The first of these two equations (4) says that  must be the solution to the household’s problem of 
minimising for given level of the public good the expenditures required to achieve the utility level  at 
the prices  and is therefore equal to the vector of compensated demand functions. The second 
equation (5)  says that the household’s unearned income  must be sufficient to finance the cost of 
these transactions as represented by the value of the expenditure function . 
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By Walras' law we can delete either (8) or (10). Deleting the government’s budget 
constraint (10), by the homogeneity of  and  in  of degree one 
and degree zero, respectively, it is easy from the two remaining equations, (8) and (9) 
and (11), to establish that the value of one consumer price and one producer price can 
be fixed as a matter of normalisation. We can therefore without loss of generality 
assume that the supply of the primary factor to the market is untaxed, i.e.  (see 
Munk 1978 for details). 
 
3. Optimal tax rules without congestion 
The purpose of this section is twofold: First for the case where the public good is not 
congested, in order to facilitate the subsequent analysis using the expenditure function 
approach to derive the conditions for an optimal tax system and to identify what 
determines the optimal tax system; then to derive the same conditions using the 
indirect utility function approach. Second, when the public good is congested to 
identify why using the indirect utility function approach, it is difficult to eliminate 
income effects in deriving optimal tax formulae. 
 
Since the production structure has been assumed to be linear, producer prices may be 
treated as fixed. Deleting with reference to Walras' law the material balance condition 
(8), the government’s maximisation problem of choosing an optimal tax system may 
using the expenditure function approach be formulated as (see Dixit 1975 and Dixit 
and Munk 1977) 
 
 
 (12) 
The corresponding Lagrangian expression is 
  (13) 
The first order conditions with respect to u and , for an optimal solution 
are5, 
  (14) 
 = 0 k∈(0,1,2) (15) 
                                                 
5 Notice that is not an instrument variable for the government. However, differentiation with respect 
to   provides a convenient method of deriving an expression for the net social marginal value of 
income, . 
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where, , , and . 
From (14) we obtain an expression for the net social marginal value of income (see 
Diamond 1975) 
   (16) 
where . 
Reordering (15) and defining  we obtain,6 
   (17) 
where because the Slutsky matrix  is negative definite, . In the Mirrlees 
tradition of the analysis of optimal commodity taxation (see Mirrlees 1976), (17) is 
interpreted that at the optimum the reduction in compensated demand for all 
commodities  relative to the first-best solution  
is approximately proportional, the so-called Ramsey rule. However, for commodity 0 
we have 
   (18) 
As the untaxed consumption of labour within the household, which somewhat 
misleadingly in the literature is called “leisure”, is in fact encouraged, it seems more 
informative to interpret (17) and (18) as saying that the basic distortion caused by the 
government being obliged to base taxation on observation of the household’s net 
demand, rather than on lump-sum taxes, is a discouragement of the labour supply, and 
that the compensated demand for all produced commodities is reduced at 
approximately the same rate as the supply of labour to the market.  
The fact that the basic distortion of the government being obliged to base taxation on 
commodity taxes rather than lump-sum taxes  suggests that a tax reform involving 
replacing a proportional tax system by a non-proportional tax system where the tax 
rates on those produced commodities, which are highly complementary with leisure, 
have been increased, and the tax rates for those, which are less so, have been 
decreased, will alleviate this basic distortion by increasing the supply of labour to the 
market, and hence increase welfare. However, differentiating tax rates obviously 
cannot increase welfare indefinitely as it creates another distortion: the marginal rates 
of substitution in consumption between produced commodities become more and more 
at variance with the marginal rates of transformation in production. Therefore the 
                                                 
6 This result can, as is well-known, also be achieved using the Indirect utility functions approach, 
eliminating income effects using the Slutsky equation, however, with less ease of derivation and 
interpretation (see below). 
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optimal tax system represents a compromise between two objectives: Objective 1, to 
encourage the supply of labour to the market, and Objective 2, to limit the distortion of 
the marginal rate of substitution in consumption between produced goods (see Munk 
2010 for a formal, but non-technical proof). This proposition essentially explains what 
determines the optimal tax system. However, to establish a reference for the optimal 
tax formula in the case of a congested public good, we derive and interpret an optimal 
tax formula, which provide further insight into what determines the optimal tax system 
as a trade-off between the two objectives mention above. 
 
Choosing the primary factor as untaxed numeraire, the first order conditions for an 
optimal tax system (17) can be written as  
  (19) 
Solving for the optimal tax rates, yields the following well-known optimal tax 
formulae (see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, pp 375-376) 
  (20) 
where D= - >0 and where are compensated demand 
elasticities. 
 
The Allen (or Allen-Uzawa) elasticity of substitution, , may be defined as 
 ,  
where  is the full income expenditure function. Since , where 
, we may therefore rewrite (20) as  
  (21) 
The interpretation of (21) may be summarised as follows (see Munk 2010): 
 
“In an economy with two produced goods and one primary factor, labour, the optimal 
tax system will be characterised by  
a) The good which is most complementary with leisure in terms of the Allen-
Uzawa elasticity of substitution, will always be taxed at the highest rate, i.e. if 
at the optimum , then ; 
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b)  for a given value of the elasticity of substitution between the two produced 
goods, , the difference in tax rates is the greater, the greater the numerical 
value of  ; 
c) for a given values of  the difference is also the greater, the smaller is 
.” 
Taking as an indicator of Objective 1,  and  as in indicator of Objective 2, 
as defined above, this proposition may for an economy with only two produced goods 
be seen as a rigorous proof of the proposition that the optimal tax system should be 
understood as a compromise between these two objectives7. 
 
To gain further insight into why it is difficult to eliminate income effects using the 
indirect utility function approach, we now derive (17) using this method. The indirect 
utility function may be written as 
 (22) 
Substitution for  in (10) by (22), all the equilibrium conditions required for a tax 
system  to be feasible, may be represented by one equation, which may be 
interpreted as the government’s budget constraint 
 (23) 
We may therefore alternatively using the indirect utility function approach formulate 
the government’s maximisation problem as 
 s. t.  
 (24) 
The corresponding Lagrangian expression is 
  (25) 
The first order conditions with respect to , for an optimal solution are 
 = 0 k∈(0,1,2) (26) 
Reordering we have  
  k∈(0,1,2) (27) 
which may be compared with (17).   
                                                 
7 The larger is  , the larger will be the increase in the supply of labour by a given increase in the 
differentiation of tax rates. The larger is  , the larger will be the increase in the distortion of the  
consumption  of produced commodities by a given increase in the differentiation of tax rates. 
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There are, however, two major difficulties in interpreting (27).  Both the sign and 
magnitude of   and  (in contrast to the sign of ) depend of 
which rule of normalisation has been adopted. Therefore, in the optimal tax literature 
in the Mirrlees tradition, the optimal tax formula (27) is transformed into (17) by using 
the identity 
   (28) 
Differentiating by prices and reordering, we obtain the Slutsky equation 
   k∈(0,1,2) (29) 
Substituting by (29), we can transform (27) into (17) and then, as when using the 
expenditure function approach, derive (20) (see e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz, op. cit) and 
thus (21).  
However, when the public good is congested, eliminating income effects becomes 
much more complicated as we now, rather than (28), have 
  (30) 
In the seminal contribution to the analysis of optimal taxation with externalities 
Sandmo (1975) did not eliminate income effects when deriving optimal tax formulae. 
Instead in his and subsequent contributions, analytical results have been derived by 
imposing separability assumptions which facilitate the analysis, but which may not 
adequately reflect reality8. This avenue to derive analytical results has also been 
followed in the analysis of the double-dividend issue. As we shall see in Section 5, the 
likelihood of a green tax reform being associated with a double-dividend has as a 
consequence been underestimated and even at times ruled out by these assumptions. 
 
4. Optimal tax rules with a congested public good 
We now turn to the characterisation of the optimal tax system when the public good is 
congested. We derive optimal tax formulae in terms of compensated demand effects 
using the expenditure function approach bypassing the problem of solving (30) to 
obtain a modified Slutsky equation. Our results may be compared with those derived 
by Sandmo (1975, 2000) and Mayeres and Proost (1997). 
 
Again with reference to Walras' law, we delete the material balance condition (8). 
Imposing as constraints the remaining general equilibrium conditions (9)-(11) the 
government’s maximisation problem becomes  
  s.t. 
                                                 
8 To our knowledge in the existing literature the elimination of income effects from optimal tax 
formulae in the case of externalities has not been achieved without making potentially unrealistic 
separability assumptions.  
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  (31) 
The corresponding Lagrangian expression is 
 (32) 
First order conditions with respect to , , e and A, respectively, are9 
  (33) 
 = 0  k∈(0,1,2) (34) 
   =0 (35) 
  = 0  (36) 
where . 
Differentiating  by  we obtain 
  (37) 
  (38) 
The last factor in (38) we call the feed back factor, (see Sandmo 1975, 2000). 
It indicates the factor by which the partial effect on the congested public good of 
a price change has to be multiplied to obtain the total effect. If the public good is 
complementary with the dirty good this factor is less than 1. 
Before characterising the optimal tax formula we interpret the Lagrangian multipliers. 
The marginal net social value of household income is . From (33), using that 
=1/ , = / , we have  
                                                 
9 Notice that  is not an instrument variable for the government. However, differentiation with respect 
to   constitute a convenient way to derive an expression for the social value of a marginal increase in 
the public good, . 
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 +  (39) 
where  is the gross social marginal value of income. We thus interpret , in 
analogy with the net social marginal value of income without a congested public good, 
as the increase in social welfare if the income of the household were increased by one 
unit from outside the economy. 
The social value of a marginal increase in the public good is . Defining the value in 
monetary terms of a marginal increase in the public good as , from (35) we 
have that the social value of a marginal increase in the public good is 
  (40)  
where 
1)  is the social value of the increase in the public good 
2)  is the social value of the change in tax revenue due to the 
change in the tax base as a result of an increase in the public good, and 
3)  is the feed back factor as defined above. 
For the interpretation of the condition for an optimal tax system, it is helpful first to 
establish what would be the optimal tax system under first best assumptions, i.e. if 
lump-sum taxation had been feasible. In this case . Assuming as a matter of 
normalisation that labour is untaxed, by substituting by (41) and (42) in (33)-(36), we 
see that the first order conditions for an optimal tax system are satisfied by  
  (41) 
  (42) 
At the optimum the Pigouvian tax  is thus equal to the marginal evaluation of an 
increase in the consumption of the dirty good. 
Under second best assumptions we have from (34) that 
   k∈(0,1,2) (43) 
Multiplying on both sides by , summing over k and reordering, we have using that 
 
  (44) 
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The first term is negative because  is negative semi-definite, but the 
second term may be positive. It therefore possible that the marginal costs of 
government funds, , may be smaller than the net social value of income . This will 
be the case if the government’s revenue requirement  is smaller than the revenue 
which a Pigouvian tax would generate. In the following we assume that the 
government’s requirement will be greater than that, with implication that the Marginal 
Costs of Government Funds (MCGF)  is greater than 1. 
Setting  as a matter of normalisation, solving (43) for the optimal tax rates, we 
obtain the following conditions to be satisfied for an optimal tax system 
  (45) 
where  and . 
This is similar to the expression for an optimal tax system without congestion (20) 
except for the second term in the tax formula for the dirty good. The optimal tax 
system may thus be interpreted as a compromise between now three rather than two 
objectives 
Objective 1: to encourage the supply of labour to the market, , 
Objective 2: to limit the distortion the marginal rate of substitution in 
consumption between produced commodities, . 
Objective 3: to limit the congestion of the public good. 
Under first-best assumptions where lump-sum taxation is possible, the optimal tax on 
the dirty good depends only on the external effect of its consumption. Under second-
best assumptions the characterisation of the optimal tax system is more complex. The 
optimal tax on the dirty good depend on the relative strength of the three competing 
objectives. Objective 3 will always pull the optimal tax on the dirty good in the 
direction of a relative high tax rate. If the dirty good is less complementary with the 
supply of labour than the clean good, Objective 1 will pull in same direction. Notice 
also that the complementarity between the public good and the tax base, thus its 
complementarity with the supply of labour to the market, influence the optimal tax on 
the dirty good. 
 
 12 
5. Conditions for a green tax reform being associated 
with a double-dividend 
We define a "Green tax reform" as a tax reform  which involves a 
increase in the tax rate on the dirty good, i.e. where . If the optimal solution is 
not constrained by administrative costs, then at the optimum for a feasible change in 
tax rates, , (keeping the tax on labour fixed as a matter of normalisation) 
we have from (32) 
  (46) 
where .  
However, we now assume10 
Additional assumptions:  
- Differentiating tax rates on produced goods involve extra administrative costs 
compared to a proportional tax system. 
- Due to these administrative costs a proportional tax system has been the 
optimal tax system. 
- After the exogenous reduction in the administrative costs a green tax reform 
has become desirable 
- Leisure is a normal good 
 
Assuming finally as a matter of normalisation that labour income is taxed at the rate 
, these assumptions imply that 
 >0 (47) 
where  is the first order approximation of the change in the 
externality due to the tax reform and  the change in administrative costs. 
 
We divide  into two dividends: 
• the "First dividend", D1, being the change in social welfare due to the decrease in 
the externality, , and  
• the "Second dividend", D2, being the residual change in social welfare.  
As a matter of definition, we say that a green tax reform is associated with a "double-
dividend", if the second dividend is positive. 
                                                 
10 Transport provides an example where these assumptions are satisfied: Economic growth has increased 
congestion increasing the benefit of a tax on road transport, whereas the administrative costs of road 
pricing have been reduced by the reduction of the costs of GPS systems and of mobile phones. 
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Based on (47) the first dividend and second dividend may thus be approximated by, 
respectively,  
  (48) 
  (49) 
Substituting in (49) by (47) we have 
 = +  (50) 
We now identify conditions, which will assure that a green tax reform will be 
associated with a double-dividend. 
Proposition 1: Suppose the Additional assumptions hold, then a green tax reform will 
be associated with a double-dividend iff it increases the labour supply. 
 
Proof: 
From the government’s budget constraint (10) by total differentiation we have 
 + + + - =0 (51) 
The assumption that the green tax reform increases the labour supply implies 
 
which in turn implies that  
 + + =- >  (52) 
As the green tax reform is welfare improving, i.e. ,  (as we have 
assumed that leisure is a normal good). Therefore 
 + >-  (53) 
Finally since  
 + >  (54) 
* 
Furthermore as a corollary to Proposition 1 we have: 
Corollary 1 to Proposition 1:  
Assuming that  
 14 
- the dirty good is less complementary with the supply of labour to the market 
than the clean good, i.e.   
- the public good is complementary with the supply of labour to the market i.e. 
  
- these two effect are not dominated by the income effect  
then the green tax reform will be associated with a double dividend. 
 
If private goods are separable from the externality (as for example assumed by 
Bovenberg, 1999), then the utility functions may be written as  
  (55) 
If the optimal tax system prior to the shock has been proportional, then (50) simplifies 
to 
 = +  (56) 
If furthermore labour is assumed separable from the consumption of produced goods  
(as for example by Bovenberg and Mooij 1994) so that the utility functions may be 
written as  
  (57) 
then 11 
   (58)  
This leads to  
Corollary 2 to Proposition 1:  
Assuming  
- that the private goods are separable from the externality  
- that labour is separable from the consumption of final goods 
then a green tax reform will not be associated with a double dividend. 
 
The exogenous change which has provided the justification for a green tax reform 
clearly also provide the possibility for a welfare increasing change in  government 
expenditures on abatement, A. 
Proposition 2: 
Assuming that the Additional assumptions hold, then a social welfare maximising 
adjustment in abatement in response to the green tax reform adds to the double 
dividend if a green tax reform decreases the marginal evaluation of the public good 
. 
                                                 
11 Since . 
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Proof:  
From (36) we obtain the condition for the optimal level of abatement  
 
where  
 is the social marginal value of abatement 
 the effect of abatement on the tax base.  
 the Marginal Costs of Government Funds (MCGF) 
In general the change in abatement will change , and thus the first dividend (see 
(48)). Although the adjustment of the level of abatement after the implementation of a 
green tax reform always will increase social welfare, its effect on the size of the 
double-dividend is ambiguous (see Sandmo 2000). When the dirty good is more 
complementary with leisure than the clean good, a green tax reform will decrease the 
marginal costs of government funds  by improving the efficiency of the 
tax system and hence justify an increase of public expenditures. However, the higher 
tax on the dirty good will increase the amount of the congested public good, decrease 
the marginal evaluation of the public good  and thus the marginal benefit of 
abatement . If the latter effect is stronger than the former, 
the green tax reform will decrease the optimal level of abatement which in turn will 
justify a higher tax on the dirty good. A decrease in the level of abatement will 
increase the marginal evaluation of the public good  and thus crease the first 
dividend. If this increase in the first dividend is smaller than the third dividend, the 
double dividend will increase. 
* 
5. The tax on road transport application 
To provide intuition for the theoretical results and an example of when a green tax 
reform is likely to result in a significant double dividend, we consider a situation 
where roads are heavily congested.  
We consider a situation where exogenous changes in technology have reduced the 
administrative costs a tax on transport at a higher rate than on other goods, although 
such a tax involves additional administrative costs of tax administration12.  
                                                 
12 The evolution of GPS and mobile phone technology has over the last 20 years dramatically reduced 
the administrative costs of road pricing, thus making it a practical proposition, which, however, still face 
considerable political opposition.  
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In order to be able to employ a graphical illustration, we first adopt a first best, partial 
equilibrium framework. We interpret the “dirty good”  as the consumption of 
transport (a composite good involving the use of a transport vehicle, fuel etc., and the 
use of time when transportation is not constrained by road capacity), the “clean good” 
 as all other consumption, “abatement”  as investments in road infrastructure, 
and the “public good”  as available road capacity defined as  
       (59) 
where  is a measure of available road capacity when there are no or few cars 
on the road, and  the negative external effect of the consumption of transport 
on available road capacity i.e. with . Furthermore, we assume  that , 
i.e. that the marginal reduction in available  road capacity due to extra traffic increases 
by the level of road transport, as is in general assumed in traffic models. 
We express the benefit of road transportation, i.e. the service of being moved from one 
place to another, taking into account the costs of the associated use of time, as a 
function of the consumption of the transport good and of available road capacity, by 
  (60) 
where  and . 
The equilibrium use of road transport without taxation  (i.e. the “open access 
equilibrium”) is given by the marginal private benefit being equal to the marginal 
private costs, i.e. by 
  (61) 
We assume that prior to reform, transportation has been heavily congested, i.e. that 
available road capacity has been below the level corresponding to where the gross 
benefit from transportation is at its maximum, i.e. that (the “maximum 
sustainable yield”), as illustrated in Figure 1. 13 
 
The optimal level of transport  is where the marginal social benefit is equal to 
the marginal costs, i.e. where 
  (62) 
The optimal level of transport  may be achieved by a Pigouvian tax, given by 
                                                                                                                                             
 
13 The reader familiar with fishery economics will recognise that this graph as a standard tool used in 
fishery economics to analyse overfishing and overcapacity and optimal regulation of the fisheries. 
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  (63) 
in Figure 1 represented by the difference in slope between the line and the line 
. 
 
Figure 1 The consumption of the transport good without taxation  and with a 
Pigouvian tax  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first dividend is the difference between  and . 
Under first best assumptions there is no double dividend as taxation is assumed not to 
involve distortionary costs. 
 
In addition to the transport good, transportation requires use of time . 
The use of time is increasing in the use of transport and decreasing in available road 
capacity. The actual use of time for a given level of road infrastructure may thus be 
written as  
  (64) 
The introduction of a Pigouvian tax reduces, as illustrated in Figure 2, the use of time 
in transportation at the optimal level of transport infrastructure  
  
and indirectly due to the increase in time associated with the initial use of the amount 
of the transport good due to the increase in available  road capacity 
  
 
 
B 
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Figure 2 Time used for road transport as a function of the consumption of the 
transport good 
 
Time used for road transport 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Transport good 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that because transportation before the reform was heavily 
congested, the decrease in the time used for transportation due to the introduction of 
the Pigouvian tax, , is likely to be substantial. 
 
Under first best assumptions, it does not matter for the evaluation of a tax reform how 
it affects the labour supply, as raising government revenue is assumed not to be 
associated with distortionary costs. However, under second best assumptions this is 
important as an increase in the supply of labour to the market will bring additional 
revenue to the government without increasing tax rates. If a tax reform involving a tax 
on road transport increases the labour supply, this will generate a double-dividend. The 
labour supply is as we have already identified affected through two channels, by the 
effect on the labour supply as a result of the change in taxes directly, and by the effect 
on labour supply of the decrease in congestion. If transport is more complementary to 
leisure than to other goods, then the tax changes will increase the labour supply 
( ). The decrease in congestion will in addition increase the labour 
supply substantially ( ) if prior to the reform transportation was heavily 
congested, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Furthermore, the increase in the tax on road transport will decrease the marginal 
evaluation of road infrastructure and thus justify a reduction in the amount of road 
infrastructure, which in turn will result in a decrease in the available road capacity.The 
 
X1 
 
x1,e0) 
 
 x1,e0) 
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result is an decrease in the first dividend, as the reduction in road infrastructure will 
increase the marginal evaluation of available road capacity. If the increase in welfare 
due to the initial tax on road transport remains the same, the decrease in government’s 
expenditures on road infrastructure will therefore decrease the second dividend, but it 
will add a third dividend due to the adjustment of the road infrastructure to its optimal 
level. This third dividend added to the second dividend constitutes the double dividend 
(see the discussion in Section 5 on this point). Road transport thus provides an 
illustration of Proposition 2, i.e. that adjustment in abatement following the 
introduction of road pricing provides an additional source of welfare gain and 
potentially an increase of the double-dividend. This also underlines what is often not 
appreciated in the public debate, that if road transport is not taxed at its optimal level, 
then investments in road infrastructure should not necessarily be made where there is 
most congestion. 
However, as we have seen in the theoretical analysis, these effects, which generates a 
double-dividend, will be assumed away if congestion is assumed separable from 
consumption, and if consumption is assumed separable from leisure. It is therefore 
important when calculating the benefits of the introduction of road pricing to use a 
model which not only account for the general equilibrium effects, but also represents 
the interaction between the consumption of the transport good and the level of 
congestion on the one hand and the supply of labour on the other hand (see Munk 2008 
which quantify the social welfare gain of the introduction of road pricing using a 
stylised CGE model which represent these important linkages). 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
We have characterised optimal taxation with a congested public good where 
differentiating tax rates is associated with administrative costs using the expenditure 
function approach. Within this framework we have established that a green tax reform 
may result in a substantial double-dividend if the dirty good is complementary with 
leisure and if an increase in the public good increases the supply of labour to the 
market. 
How often a significant double-dividend will materialise in practice is an empirical 
question. Empirical models constructed to evaluate green tax reforms have often been 
based on separability assumptions which a priori rule out a double-dividend. The 
question therefore cannot be answered on the basis of such models. It requires a model 
which can represent the differences in the complementarity of different commodities 
with leisure, and the non-separability of the environmental good. By using the 
expenditure function approach we have been able to conduct the analysis without 
imposing such separability assumptions. We have provided road transport as an 
example where a green tax reform is likely to be associated with a substantial double-
dividend. In many countries roads have increasingly become heavily congested. 
Technological developments have significantly decreased the administrative costs of 
monitoring the social damage caused by road transport. A tax reform which increases 
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the tax on transport (road pricing) therefore provides a relevant example of a green tax 
reform which is likely to be associated with a substantial double-dividend. 
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